We investigate the capital structure of 350 Dutch insurers during the period 1995-2005. Our main findings are: (1) a small company size, a mutual organisation, high profitability, large equity investments, or being a fire insurer, all contribute to higher solvency margins; (2) minimum solvency requirements from the supervisor are less easy to explain by firm characteristics and do not correlate positively with risk; (3) neither do insurers follow solvency requirements closely; (4) most insurers have surplus capital which, together with a large company size and high profitability, reduces the risk of insolvency.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, a number of Dutch mutual insurance companies changed their corporate structure and got listed on the stock market, a trend earlier observed in the United States (e.g.
Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003) . Presumably, a main reason for a stock listing is to get broader access to funding, in order to finance growth. The capital structure generally differs quite a lot between mutual and stock insurance companies (Harrington and Niehaus, 2002 ).
This partly reflects their different risk characteristics (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993) .
We investigate the capital structure of mutual versus stock i nsurance companies, using a data set of about 350 Dutch insurers from all lines of business 1 during the period 1995-2005. The dataset is quite unique, because it not only contains data on actual capital but also on minimum capital requirements prescribed by the supervisor. This offers an opportunity to extend the analysis of determinants of actual capital structures to the explanation of solvency requirements, the modelling of the probability of undercapitalization, and an analysis of the extent to which in surers take such prudential requirements into account when setting their solvency targets. We estimate models explaining (1) the actual solvency margin, (2) the solvency margin required by the supervisor, (3) the difference between the two, and (4) the probability of undercapitalization defined by a solvency margin below 150% of the required solvency margin.
Our objective is to provide more insight into differences in capitalization between types of insurance companies, with different corporate structures and in various lines of business. In particular, it is useful to explore to what extent solvency requirements play a relevant role in insurers' financial decisions. This may also be relevant in the context of changes in the supervisory framework foreseen f or the next years.
Our study is structured as follows. The next section discusses the main characteristics of the Dutch insurance sector and recent developments in solvency indicators. Section 3 formulates a number of hypotheses based on theories of capital structure, which are tested in subsequent sections. Section 4 explains our dataset and methodology. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Health, property-liability and life insurance. Table 1 shows how the number of mutual and stock insurance c ompanies evolved since 1995.
THE DUTCH INSURANCE SECTOR
Both groups represent a significant proportion, although stock insurers are clearly the majority. Over time, the number of institutions gradually declines, reflecting consolidation within the financial sector.
[Insert Table 1 solvency margins, the former may be undercapitalized while the latter is overcapitalized. It appears that mutual companies have higher solvency ratios than stock companies. The median solvency margin is 4 to 6 times higher than required for mutual companies, while it is 2 to 3 times higher for stock companies.
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Figure 2 shows the solvency ratio by line of business. Interestingly, fire insurers have much higher solvency margins than required during the whole sample period; their solvency margins are on average 8 times the required level. On the othe r hand of the spectrum is life insurance, with a solvency ratio of about 2 to 3 times the minimum requirement. The solvency ratios in the other lines of business move within a range of 250% to 400%.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Strictly speaking, any insurance company should have a solvency ratio of at least 100%. In practice, however, the ratio is substantially higher. Figure 3 [Insert Figure 3 about here]
THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) we know that the choice of the optimal capital structure is a trade -off between costs and benefits of holding capital. This is the case for any company, and thus also for an insurance company. The main benefit of holding a capital buffer is that it helps to avoid financial distress when there are high losses on the insurance portfolio or the investment portfolio. For an insurance company, the probability of insolvency can be further reduced by risk diversification. This can be achieved by combining different lines of business and by holding a diversified investment portfolio. An insurer can also reinsur e part of the insurance risks elsewhere.
Capital structure theory tells that i nsurers will not hold substantial amounts o f capital to eliminate the probability of bankruptcy. This is because holding capital is costly. Among the costs of holding capital, agency costs are quite important (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Agency costs of insurance companies are associated with owner-manager conflicts and owner-policyholder conflicts. The former arise because managers do not fully share in the residual claim held by owners. This gives managers incentives to try to expropriate a fraction of the surplus. Conflicts between owners and policyholders arise because policyholders' claims to assets have legal priority over owners' claims. Agency theory predicts that the optimal capital structure is determined by trading off the benefits from low capitalization (mitigating the owner -manager conflict) with the benefits from more capitalization (mitigating the owner-policyholder conflict). Depending on the dominant type of conflict within a company, the firm may be under-or overcapitalized.
Mutual and stock companies differ in the way they are prone to agency cost (e.g. Mayers and Smith, 1981; Laux and Muermann, 2006) . A mutual is an organization in which the customers or policy holders are also the owners of the company. By contrast, stock organizations are characterized by a strict separation b etween owners and customers. While mutual insurers control the owner-policyholder conflict by merging these two entities into one, the ownermanager conflict is arguably more severe than for stock companies, because the mechanisms available for owners to control managers are more limited than in the stock ownership form.
One would expect the benefits from removing the owner-policyholder conflict to exceed the costs of unresolved owner-manager conflicts in mutual insurance firms. Consequently, the elimination of the owner-policyholder conflict is likely to result in a reduced marginal benefit from holding capital in mutuals, suggesting that mutual insurers may be less capitalized than stock insurers, other things equal (Cummins and Nini, 2002) . Hence, the agency theoretic prediction is that mutual insurers have lower capitalization than stock insurers.
As mutual insurers' main source of capital is their policyholders, it would be very difficult to raise additional funding in a limited period of time. Stock i nsurers, on the other hand, especially if they are large and have a good track record, have easier access to the public capital market. Because of this comparative disadvantage in raising external capital, mutual insurers may, for precautionary reasons, ha ve higher optimal capital ratios (Froot and Stein, 1998; Harrington and Niehaus, 2002) . This higher valuation of 'slack' capital by mutuals would be consistent with the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) .
Asymmetric information between s uppliers and applicants of capital makes it harder, especially for smaller, less well-known insurers, to obtain additional capital from the market if the need arises. Therefore such firms may prefer to retain and hold on to profits as a buffer of internal funding instead of depending on the capital market. This preference for internal over external financing is known as the pecking order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . If this hypothesis holds, more profitable insurers will have higher capitalization than less profitable insurers.
We will use these theoretical insights when specifying our empirical models in the empirical section of this study.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We use data from supervision, which are published in aggregated form in DNB's Statistical
Bulletin. The unbalanced panel consists of 300 to 350 insurance companies, of which 37% are mutual insurers (Table 1 ). In our regression analysis, we try to explain several dependent variables that are related to insurers' solvency. These are (1) the actual solvency margin, (2) the required solvency margin, (3) the difference between these two, the so-called 'solvency surplus', and (4) the probability of undercapitalization. Appendix A gives the definitions for the solvency indicators and shows their trends. In choosing the first dependent variable, the actual solvency margin, we follow other US studies that use similar measures of capitalization. The research question is: what determines the level of capitalization actually maintained by insurers. The second independent variable investigated, the required minimum solvency margin set by the supervisory authority -the availability of which makes our dataset rather unique -allows us to deepen the analysis. This type of data offers an opportunity to extend the analysis of capital structure to the explanation of solvency requirements, the modelling of the probability of undercapitalization, and an assessment of the extent to which insurers incorporate these prudential requirements when targeting their capital structures. The third dependent variable is comparable to the solvency ratio (i.e. the ratio of actual over required solvency margins) that is normally used as an important solvency indicator by the supervisory authority; we prefer the difference form over the ratio form because the former allows easier interpretation of the regression coefficients. The trends in both measures are comparable, as shown in Appendix A.
The explanatory variables are based on the theoretical insights discussed in the previous section:
(1) Mutual. This is a dummy variable taking a value of one for mutual and zero for stock companies. A priori, this variable's impact on a firm's solvency is ambiguous, as indicated in Section 3. While agency theory predicts lower capitalization for mutual insurers because of the elimination of the owner -policyholder conflict, the pecking order hypothesis expects that mutual insurers have a greater tendency than stock insurers to hoard capital because of their limited ability to access capital markets.
(2) Company size. Presumably, as large insurers have more scope for diversification than small insurers, their total losses are more predictable. Hence, large firms probably need a relatively lower capitalization to achieve a particular level of insolvency risk. The size of the company is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.
(3) Shares. The proportion of shares in the investment portfolio is a standard measure for the risk profile of the insurer's asset portfolio. The more volatile assets are held by the firm, for a given solvency ratio, the more vulnerable it is for asset price fluctuations that could lead to undercapitalization. Hence, we expect a higher proportion of shares in the portfolio to require a higher level of capitalization.
(4) Profitability. A profitable firm has more internal funds at its disposal that can be hoarded as a buffer, so higher profitability will lead to higher solvency margins when insurers' financial behaviour is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis.
Profitability is measured by return on assets. As profits are influenced by all operational and financial decisions of the insurer, some interaction between profitability and the other variables is to be expected. We will come back to this later on.
(5) Reinsurance. If a company reinsures the bulk of its risks elsewhere, it should require lower capitalization to achieve a given level of insolvency risk. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between the use of reinsurance and capital. The use of reinsurance is measured by the proportion of reinsurance premiums paid in total premiums earned.
(6) Long-tailed business. The ratio of loss reserves over incurred losses is a proxy for the time lag between policy issuance and the payment of the claims, with higher ratios indicatin g longer tailed business. As this ratio increases, the managers are in control of the policyholder s' funds for a longer time, which offers the managers the opportunity for engaging in activities that provide private benefits, possibly at the detriment of the company and policyholders. This will raise the agency cost of capital and urge insurers to choose lower capital levels (Cummings and Nini, 2002) . Moreover, long-tail lines of insurance tend to generate less income from underwriting than shorter -tail lines, putting long-tailed insurers at a disadvantage in raising internal capital. Hence, we expect a negative effect of long-tailed business on capital utilization.
(7) Risk . Higher risk requires more capitalization. Risk is measured by the standard deviation of the loss ratio per firm (e.g. Meyers, 1989; Guo and Winter, 1997; LammTennant and Starks, 1993) . The loss ratio is the ratio of losses incurred to premiums earned and is a frequently used proxy for profitability in the insurance literature. This measure of risk captures the risk on the insurance portfolio, while the earlier mentioned variable Shares measures the risk on the investment portfolio .
(8) Herfindahl. This index measures the degree to which an insurer is diversified across lines of business. Insurers with more diversified underwriting portfolios are expected to run less insolvency risk and therefore require less capitalization (e.g. Klein et al., 2002; Cummins and Nini, 2002) . Lower Herfindahl indices imply higher diversification and, consequently, we expect a positive effect on the use of capital.
(9) Line of business. A dummy variable for each line of business taking the value of one if the company in that year is predominantly in that line of business and zero if it is not.
This dummy variable should capture any remaining unobservable, time-invariant effects related to the line of business an insurer is active in.
(10) Year. A year dummy for each sample year. This dummy variable captures the effects of macro-economic trends or structural breaks, which are common to all insurers. To our knowledge, there have been no significant structural breaks in the supervisory framework during the sample period. Table 2 summarizes the above-mentioned theoretical predictions for the explanatory variables (Appendix A summarizes their definitions). The predictions fall in three categories: agency cost theory, risk theory, and pecking order theory. In the second column we also give the theoretical prediction for the required solvency margin prescribed by the supervisory authority. As prudential supervisors are primarily focused on the prevention of insolvency risks, we assume that minimum solvency requirements will be set in line with risk theoretical predictions regarding the risk profiles of insurers. We doubt, however, that either the agency theory or the pecking order theory yield usable predictions for the prudential behavior of the supervisor. It is not realistic to assume, for example, that minimum solvency requirements will be set higher for companies that are for some reason more prone to manager-owner conflicts, nor is it to be expected that requirements are higher for companies that can retain moreprofits because they are more profitable. Therefore, the cells for the agency and pecking order theories in this column are left open.
[Insert Table 2 about here] insurers. This is in accordance with the findings for US insurers (Harrington and Niehaus, 2002) . Mutual insurers are also required to have higher solvency margins, but the difference is much smaller than for actual solvency margins. Mutual insurers are smaller sized, invest more in shares, are more profitable, use more reinsurance, and have shorter tailed business. In the US mutual insurers are also smaller and invest more in shares than stock insurers, but are less instead of more profitable (Harrington and Niehaus, 2002) .
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When looking at medians, mutual insurers are in less risky business, which is consistent with the findings for US insurers by Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) . Finally, stock companies are more diversified across different lines of business than mutual insurers according to the differences in their mean
Herfindahl indexes.
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 gives the summary statistics for the same set of variables by line of business. Life insurers have and are required to have the lowest solvency margins. Fire insurers have much more capital than required, as already noted when discussing Figure 2 ; the median fire insurer has a surplus solvency margin of 50.6 percentage point. Life insurers' solvency margins are closest to required margins (the surplus is only 5.5 percentage point). The largest insurers are to be found among life insurers, followed by car and health insurers. Fire insurers are among the smallest. Surprisingly, life insurers invest relatively little in shares, while their liabilities are typically long-term and in the long run the highest investment returns are to be expected from shares. Profitability is lowest for life insurers. The same holds for transport insurers, who also invest relatively little in shares. Fire, transport and other non-life insurers are heavy users of reinsurance. Life insurance is typically long-tailed, around 8 times longer than nonlife insurance. Risk is relatively low for car insurers. Generally, due to the skewness of the distribution for higher risks, mean risk is higher than me dian risk, especially for transport and other non-life insurance. Car insurers stand out as being more diversified overdifferent lines of business; their median Herfindahl index is 0.533.
[Insert Table 4 about here] Table 4 also gives the numbers of mutual and stock companies by line of business. Typically, life insurers are mostly stock companies, while fire insurers are mostly mutual insurers. Many mutual insurers are also to be found among health insurers. Table 5 presents the correlation coeffic ients for the (non-dummy) variables. These give insight into the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. First, we note that the correlation between the actual solvency margin and the required solvency margin is relatively low (0.383). This suggests that insurers determine their solvency margins quite independently from the minimum levels prescribed by the supervisor. Consequently, the solvency margin and the solvency surplus are correlated strongly (0.958). 4 The correlations are most ly consistent with the priors from risk theory: size is correlated negatively with capitalization, share ownership positively, long-tailed business negatively, and risk positively.
Only the positive correlation with reinsurance is unexpected. The negative correlation between company size and reinsurance indicates that smaller firms, having higher capitalizations, use more reinsurance. Possibly, size effects confuse reinsurance effects on capitalization. Finally, correlations with the Herfindahl index are ge nerally low. Profitability is positively correlated with capitalization, consistent with the pecking order hypothesis. As partial correlations such as the ones discussed here do not take the possibility into account that two variables may correlate just be cause they are both related to a third variable, we will perform a multivariate analyses in Section 5.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We use the following econometric estimators. First, we apply the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (GLS) for the cross-section time-series analysis of the solvency measures. This estimator allows for the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. The frequency distribution of undercapitalization by year is given in Table 6 . Around 12% of the sample is undercapitalized according to this criterion.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The probit approach is taken from the literature on corporate bankruptcy, being employed by e.g. Bunn and Redwood (2003) . The probit model is to be preferred to the traditional discriminant analysis according to comparative work by e.g. Lennox (1999) , who shows that the former can identify failing companies more accurately than the latter. We note that other work on company failures has recently employed the Merton (1974) model , which imposes assumptions about the value of firms' underlying assets and capital structure. Whether the firm defaults is determined by the market value of its assets in conjunction with the liability structure. However, the Merton model requires a share price to assess volatility and information on default probabilities which lack for our sample of mutual and non-listed stock companies.
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Third, we use the within estimator for the analysis of the adjustment of actual to required solvency margins over time. In this estimator the focus is on the explanation of solvency margins over time, taking the time-invariant differences in solvency levels between individual insurers as given. The research question is whether insurers rebalance their capital structures to meet supervisory capitalization requirements.
RESULTS
In this section we present the results of the multivariate anal ysis of the determinants of solvency margins (Section 5.1) and the probability of undercapitalization (Section 5.2), after which (in Section 5.3) we investigate the adjustment of actual to required solvency margins.
Determinants of actual, required an d surplus solvency margins
We regress three solvency measures -actual solvency margin, required solvency margin and solvency surplus -on the set of explanatory variables introduced above. All independent variables have been lagged once, to avoid simultaneity bias. The results of the GLS estimations are presented in Table 7 .
The model fit for the actual solvency margin is reasonably good; it explains 70% of the Figure 4 shows the contributions of the continuous explanatory variables to the variation in actual solvency margins; the bars give the partial effects of a one -standarddeviation increase in a single explanatory variable on the mean predicted solvency margin.
The figure makes clear that company size is economically most important among these variables, followed by the use of reinsurance and investments in shares. Hence, being small sized, having a mutual organisation, running high profits, investing heavily in shares, or being a fire insurer, all contribute to higher solvency margins.
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 4 about here]
We re-estimated the equation for the actual solvency margin adding the (lagged) required solvency margin to the set of regressors (model 2). This way we check the hypothesis that insurers set their solvency targets in line with supervisory requirements. The coefficient found for the required solvency margin is 0.127 and is statistically significant at conventional levels , but economically is not substantial . This confirms our first observation when discussing the low correlation between the actual and required solvency margin in Table 5 . Of course, it could be the case that, while the cross-sectional distribution of actual and required solvency margins do not strongly match, still insurers aim to move their solvency margins gradually towards required levels. This issue is taken up further in Section 5.3 where we specially investigate the adjustment process.
The fit for the required solvency margin (model 3) is less strong, with a pseudo-R 2 of 0.406.
Company size is still significant and negative, but its effect is halved compared to that on the actual solvency margin. Mutual now has a negative, though small, coefficient. Note that this multivariate analysis contradicts the univariate analysis of Ta ble 3, where mutual insurers were found to have higher solvency requirements. Hence, allowing for other factors, such as company size, makes a difference. Profitability is no longer significant, which is not unexpectedly, as there is no a priori reason why supervisory authorities should take account of pecking order behaviour, i.e. hoarding of surplus capital from internal funds. Neither reinsurance nor shares appear to affect solvency requirements, though these are risk measures.
Risk and Herfindahl are now statistically significant, but have negative, though small, coefficients. It should be noted that these theoretically disappointing findings for the risk proxies are not totally unexpected, when one realises that the figures for the legal capital require ments compiled during the sample period were not risk-based. 8 As for the other estimation results, the coefficients for the lines of business dummies suggest that transport and health insurers are required to have higher solvency margins, by 6 percentage points (vis-à-vis life insurers). Fire insurers do not require extra capitalization, which makes it even more puzzling why insurers in this line of business actually have so much capital. All in all, the required solvency margin is not easy to explain by the firm characteristics and do not correlate positively with risk.
The results for the solvency surplus (column 4), being the difference between the actual and the required solvency margin, consequently is a weighted average of the results for the former and the latter, with signs identical to the signs found in the equation of the dominant actual solvency margin. We note that all explanatory variables are now significant. Hence, being small sized, having a mutual organisation, running high profits, inves ting heavily in shares, having a long-tailed business, being in risky business, have low diversification over different lines of business, or being a fire insurer, all contribute to the explanation of higher than required solvency margins.
Determinants of probability of undercapitalization
The probit estimates are presented in Table 8 . We have added the lagged solvency surplus to the previously used set of variables. The reason is that we expect the probability of undercapitalization to be lower the higher the surplus solvency the year before. Indeed, the marginal effect for this variable is significant and negative. In the second regression we leave out the statistically insignificant variables one by one in order of significance. We are left with seven significant variables. Dropping insignificant variables with missing values for many company-years increases the sample size substantially in this second regression.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The marginal effect of mutual is -0.012, indicating that a mutual insurer's probability of undercapitalization is 1.2 percentage point lower than a stock insurer's. The effects of line of business are in the same order of magnitude (+2 percentage points for health insurers, -0.7 for mixed non-life insurers). The economic interpretation of the marginal effects for the continuous variables is less straightforward, as these represent the effects for an infinitesimal change in the explanatory variables. For ease of interpretation, Figure 5 therefore plots the probability effects for the continuous explanatory variables; the bars give the partial effects on the probability of undercapitalization of a one-standard-deviation increase for each explanatory variable. The solvency surplus in the previous year is the most im portant probability reducer, followed by company size, profitability, and long-tailed business.
Company size reduces insolvency risk because, as was mentioned earlier, losses of large insurers are more predictable than those of small firms. The insolvency risk reducing effect of long-tailed business is understandable when one realises that this variable was defined by the ratio of loss reserves to incurred losses.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
One may want to use probit model (2) to predict undercapitalization one year ahead, for it is possible to calculate the probability of undercapitalization. To do that, one has to choose a cut-off value for the probability of undercapitalization, above which value one classifies an insurer as 'insolvent'. This is an arbitrary decision that will affect the relative frequencies of errors of the first and second type that will be made. A type-I error is classifying a financially sound insurer as insolvent. A type-II error is classifying a financially distressed insurer as solvent. For a supervisor a type -II error is presumably worse than a type-I error, because it is less detrimental to financial stability to be too prudential than to be too lenient. Therefore, it is in the supervisor's interest to choose a low cut-off value. Table 9 illustrates this. By choosing a cut-off value of 0.25 one can reduce the probability of a type-II error to 37.9% (= 92/243 × 100%). At a conventional cut-off value of 0.5, this probability is 68.3%, and with a cut-off va lue of 0.8 it is even 90.95%. Hence, if the model is to be used to track insolvent insurers, it would be wise to choose a cut-off value of 0.25.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
How closely do insurers follow solvency requirements?
When discussing Table 5 and 7, we observed that the correlation between actual and required solvency margins is low. Of course, it could be the case that, while the cross-sectional distribution of actual and required solvency margins do not match, still insurers aim to move their solvency margins gradually towards the required levels over time. In this subsection we therefore explore the adjustment behaviour.
Let us assume that insurer i has a target solvency margin, 
where t is the time operant. Factor δ can be interpreted as the target solvency ratio, irrespective of other insurer-specific factors; Figure 1 suggests a value around 4. However, it should be noted beforehand that is not a priori clear whether this observed value of 4 reflects a combination of 4,0 i δα ≈= or , alternatively, 4,0 i δα <> . This is what we want to investigate here.
Next, we are interested in the adjustment process. We assume partial adjustment, because of the time and costs involved when adjusting capital structures. Specifically, we assume that an insurer adjusts his actual solvency margin gradually in case of a deviation between his actual and target solvency margin:
where λ is the partial adjustment parameter. Substitution of (1) into (2) yields:
We estimate equation (3) for the whole sample using the within estimator that incorporates the fixed company effects i α . The resulting equation reads (not reporting the 486 company specific intercepts for reasons of space): The coefficient 0.545 λ ≈ moreover implies a rather low adjustment speed.
Hence, this auxiliary estimation result confirms our earlier impressions that insurers do not follow solvency requirements closely.
CONCLUSION
We investigate d the capital structure of mutual versus stock insurance companies empirically, using a data set of about 350 Dutch insurers during the period 1995-2005. We estimated models (1) explaining actual and required solvency margins, (2) predi cting probabilities of undercapitalization, and (3) describing insurers' adjustment behaviour to solvency requirements.
Our main findings are:
1. Being small sized, having a mutual organisation, running high profits, investing heavily in shares, or being a fire insurer, all contribute to higher solvency margins.
These results are mostly consistent with the theoretical predictions that risk, agency costs and asymmetric information play an important role in the capital structure decisions of insurers.
2. Minimum solvency margins, set by the supervisory authority, are less easy to explain by firm characteristics and do not correlate positively with some risk indicators.
3. Neither do insurers follow solvency requirements closely.
4. Most insurers have surplus capital which, together with a large company size and high profitability, reduces the risk of insolvency.
Finally, we make one observation on the policy implications of our findings. The data reveal that insurers as a group hardly take capital requirements into consideration when setting capital structure targets. Half the population of insurers has thrice the amount of capital that is required, and one quarter five times or even more. For comparison sake, Figure A1 plots the median trends for the four solvency measures defined above. Long-tailed business -.
APPENDIX A -DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND SOLVENCY TRENDS

TABLES
Explanatory note: + / -indicates positive / negative expected correlation of the explanatory variable with the solvency margin. A dot indicates that the particular theory yields no prediction. Explanatory note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. The reported marginal effects are changes in the dependent variable per unit change in each independent, continuous variable. The reported fixed effects are changes in the dependent variable for a discrete change in each independent dummy variable from 0 to 1. The feasible generalized least squares estimator used allows for the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Suffixes * and ** indicate statistical significance of the effects at 95 and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Explanatory note: Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. The reported marginal effects are changes in the probability that undercapitalization = 1 for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable. The reported fixed effects are changes in the probability that undercapitalization = 1 for a discrete change in each independent dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors (not reported) are calculated using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator and allowing for correlation of observations for the same company. Suffixes * and ** indicate statistical significance of the effects at 95 and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Explanatory note: Non-life insurance companies have been assigned to a particular line of business if more than 50% of its premiums in a particular year is written in that particular line of insurance. "Mixed non-life" is the residual group of non-life companies without a premium share above 50%. s iz e p r o fi ta b il it y r e in s u r a n c e s h a r e s lo n g ta il r is k h e r fi n d a h l 
